

**Report for Decision by the Fifth Fund Council Meeting 6-8 July 2011**  
**Follow-up to the Discussion**  
**at the April 2011 CGIAR-FC Meeting of the Inception Report**  
**Establishment of a CGIAR Independent Evaluation Arrangement (IEA)**

**Contents**

1. Purpose of this Report.....	2
2. Summary of Recommendations .....	3
3. Analysis of Institutional Options.....	4
3.1 The Options of a single or split evaluation function.....	4
3.2 Evaluation staffing .....	9
Staffing Levels.....	9
The Director IEA.....	11
3.3 The Choice Between Siting the IEAO at FAO in Rome or at the World Bank in Washington.....	12
4. Workplanning and Budgeting.....	14
4.1 Function and importance of an integrated CGIAR Rolling Evaluation Work plan .....	14
4.2 Budgeting for Evaluation .....	15
Basis for the Evaluation Budget.....	20
5. Deliverables by the Consultants - During the Remainder of the Consultancy for Development of the CGIAR –IEA .....	21
6. Budget for Remainder of the Consultancy .....	22
Appendix A: Appointment, Functions and Competencies of the Director CGIAR, Independent Evaluation Arrangement (IEA) .....	23

Separate Documents provide:

Appendix B - Background and Concept Note on Evaluation in the CGIAR (this is a development of the Inception Report Considered by the FC (April 2011) covering elements not in this Report for Decision to the July 2011 FC meeting)

Annexes, covering:

- Annex 1: Summary Note on Results of Teleconferences on Draft Follow-up Note to the Discussion at the April 2011 CGIAR-FC Meeting
- Annex 2: Conclusions of Expert Reference Group at its Meetings Held on 6 and 20 June 2011
- Annex 3: Modalities for Consultation and Responsiveness to the Consortium, Centers and other Stakeholders under Option 1: Single Independent Evaluation Office (IEAO) for the CGIAR
- Annex 4: The Contribution of Evaluation to Knowledge Management and Learning in the CGIAR
- Annex 5: Evaluation Quality Management and its Relationship to the Independence of the Evaluation Function
- Annex 6: Base Data for Costs of Staff and Office Space – FAO Rome and World Bank – Washington
- Annex 7: Prospective Coverage of Guidance Materials on Evaluation Standards, Methods and Tools

Consultants for the Design of an Independent Evaluation Arrangement for the CGIAR:

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21 June 2011

## **1. Purpose of this Report**

1) At the meeting of the CGIAR Fund Council (5-6 April 2011) the Consultants for the Establishment of a CGIAR Independent Evaluation arrangement (IEA) were asked to give more details on some elements of their inception report, with, where appropriate, the pros and cons of alternative options, in order that the Fund Council, might make decisions at its July meeting. This decision report responds to those requests. A first draft was circulated for comments to Council members (Annex 1 – Summary of Discussion) and the newly constituted expert reference group (Annex 2 – Summary of Conclusions), and this report incorporates their comments (both written and in phone meetings). This report should be read for completeness in conjunction with the updated inception report which has been reworked as a background and concept note on evaluation in the CGIAR. It is found in stand-alone Appendix B.

2) The Expert Reference Group has fully endorsed this report which in its decision issues covers:

- Institutional arrangements for the IEA, in particular whether to have a single independent evaluation office for the IEA or a split evaluation function for the CGIAR (Central independent evaluation office (IEAO) and Consortium), and discussion of the options in relation to criteria such as independence and responsiveness to stakeholders;
- Physical location of the IEA Office (Rome in FAO or Washington in the World Bank);
- Staffing of the IEAO, including: how a bureaucratic tendency for this to expand over time would be addressed; whether a part time Director of the IEA is a viable option; and functions and selection of a Director for the IEA to enable timely advertisement and recruitment, if considered appropriate by the FC;
- Workplanning and budgeting;
- Decisions on deliverables and budget necessary for the satisfactory completion of the consultants' assignment.
- Brief Annexes, as requested by FC members, on:
  - How consultation with the Consortium would work in practice for a single independent evaluation office with ultimate reporting responsibility to the Fund Council (Annex 3);
  - Contribution of evaluation to learning and knowledge management in the CGIAR (Annex 4);
  - Evaluation quality management and how this relates to the independence of the evaluation function (Annex 5).

## 2. Summary of Recommendations

### Recommendations for the IEA

**Recommendation 1:** The FC is recommended to adopt Option 1, in which **the evaluation function for the CGIAR as a whole is centred in a single independent evaluation office**, reporting to the Fund Council, and required to consult closely with the Consortium, without prejudice to the office's independence or the final authority of the Fund Council. (section 3.1).

**Recommendation 2: Evaluation Staffing** should be in line with functions and evaluation will generally be commissioned to independent consultants. Proposals for minimum initial staffing, in line with Options 1&2 are provided in the text (paras 8-13).

2.1: The evaluation work plan and budget will be fixed by the FC and in order to avoid any tendency for the evaluation office to expand at the expense of the actual conduct of evaluation work: The evaluation office fixed costs, including staff, should at no stage exceed a fixed percentage of total evaluation costs (see budget discussion section 4.2 Figure 3B).

2.2. Under both Options 1 and 2 the IEA will be headed by a full-time Director with the necessary seniority. In time there may be shown to be the need for an IEA advisory committee with an independent chair but this would have a cost and it should not be a priority (paras 14-17).

2.3 The recruitment process for the IEA Director should be initiated immediately in order to start the work of the IEA early in 2012 (Appendix A) (para 17).

**Recommendation 3:** It is recommended that the IEAO be sited at FAO in Rome (section 3.3).

**Recommendation 4:** It is recommended that there be a **unified rolling evaluation workplan** for the CGIAR (with a four year time frame) and approved each one or two years by the Fund Council, following consultation by the IEAO with the Consortium (section 4.1 -see Annex 1 to this report for consultation process) (Section 4.1).

**Recommendation 5: IEA Budget (Section 4.2):**

- **The IEA should form a separate budget line under Windows 1 and 2** and not form part of the budget for system costs (Figure 3 A).
- **The IEA Budget should be set with a cap and target level** of 2% of the Windows 1&2 Expenditure (Figure 3 B).
- **Matching grants for CRP component evaluation for quality and coherence:** The decentralized evaluation of CRP components approved by the IEA (or Consortium under Option 2) should be 50% funded from the central evaluation budget as matching grants (Figure 3C).
- **The central evaluation budget should start at US\$3 million in 2012** and rise to \$4.6 million at 2011 constant prices from 2014 when the cap and target would become effective. A higher budget would be needed for the split evaluation option (para 24).
- The workings of the evaluation budget system in its entirety should be subject to review after 3 -4 years of operations.

### Recommendations for completion of the Consultancy Assignment for Design and Implementation of the IEA

**Recommendation 6: Deliverables of the Consultancy** - The FC is asked to approve the deliverables of the remainder of consultancy for development of the CGIAR – IEA as detailed in Section 5

**Recommendation 7: Budget adjustment with no change in total** - **Recommendation 7:** The FC is requested to approve an adjustment in the evaluation budget, without any change in the total budget or timing, to allow greater flexibility in completing the assignment; creating a flexible reserve to be allocated if necessary at the discretion of the lead consultant subject to normal fiduciary requirements (Section 6).

### 3. Analysis of Institutional Options

#### 3.1 The Options of a Single or Split Evaluation Function

**Recommendation 1:** The FC is recommended to adopt Option 1, in which the evaluation function for the CGIAR as a whole is centred in a single independent evaluation office, reporting to the Fund Council, and required to consult closely with the Consortium, without prejudice to the office's independence or the final authority of the Fund Council.

3) Two main options are outlined below. The first option is that of a single unified evaluation office proposed in the first draft inception report. The second is the 'split responsibilities' option which is based on the original Voices for Change proposal, but with stronger emphasis on decentralised evaluation of CRP components, by the Lead Centers/CRP management, as welcomed in previous FC discussions.

4) **Option 1: Single Independent Evaluation Office (IEAO) for the CGIAR:** The evaluation function for the CGIAR as a whole centred on a single independent evaluation office, reporting to the Fund Council, and required to consult closely with the Consortium, without prejudice to the office's independence or the final authority of the Fund Council (for consultation mechanism see Annex 3). Functions to include:

- a) **Propose a rolling evaluation workplan and budget** for the CGIAR System to the Fund Council for their approval, following prior consultation by the evaluation office with the Consortium and coordinate planning of the evaluation of CRP components, undertaken by the Centers to ensure their integration in the overall plan. **Work closely with SPIA<sup>1</sup>**, to formulate the workplan in order to ensure the **complementarity of evaluation and impact assessment** in the CGIAR.
- b) **Undertake, generally through commissioning independent consultants, the evaluation**, in line with the workplan, of:
  - The CGIAR system as a whole (terms of reference, including organizational arrangements approved by Fund Council), incorporating a full mutual accountability assessment, including that of donors and partners<sup>2</sup>;
  - CRPs as a whole and other functions such as gene banks (meta-evaluation); and
  - Such CGIAR wide themes and issues as may be identified and agreed in the workplan and budget, including at the request of the Consortium.
- c) **Maintain and propose** modifications in the comprehensive CGIAR **evaluation policy and norms** to the Fund Council for their approval, following prior consultation by the evaluation office with the Consortium.
- d) **Maintain** in line with the policy and norms, **detailed evaluation standards and guidance** for all evaluation in the CGIAR, which all entities will be expected to comply with (for details see Annex 7).

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<sup>1</sup> Several FC members, several Centers and in particular, the Expert Reference Group have strongly questioned whether SPIA should not be merged into the IEA with very evident efficiency gains (SPIA has two dedicated professional staff of which one senior, support staff, an input from the Director ISPC, and the Chair and panel). The consultants are of the view that this is likely to prove a logical development over time but could disrupt the ongoing work of SPIA during the early establishment of the IEA.

<sup>2</sup> For a discussion of mutual accountability including the responsibility of donors and partners to not only make responsible funding decisions for the CGIAR but to facilitate the process of transformation of CGIAR outputs to uptake and impact.— see Appendix B

- e) **Facilitate the system for evaluation follow-up and learning**, including: facilitating and monitoring the system of management response and follow-up reporting for all levels of evaluation; and drawing generalised lessons from evaluation and disseminating them working with the Consortium and ILAC<sup>3</sup> as appropriate.
- f) **Support and undertake quality management**, including **quality assurance**, for **evaluation of CRP components** undertaken by Lead Centers/CRP management and other decentralized evaluations as needed (an independent external panel will be included in this process).
- g) **Provide leadership in evaluation capacity building**, facilitate a **community of evaluation practice** and maintain a **public central evaluation data base** and reference website.
- h) **Produce public biennial reports to the FC and CB on evaluation in the CGIAR**, (preferably in alternative years to a performance monitoring report produced by the Consortium). The evaluation report will include assessments of the quality of evaluation processes and of IEAO and Center/CRP commissioned evaluations and of evaluation follow-up and learning, as well as synthesising overall findings and lessons from evaluation and providing summaries of evaluations.
- i) **Liaise with the Consortium to facilitate the complementarity with independent evaluation of results based monitoring and performance assessment** undertaken by the Consortium.
- j) **Defend the independence, integrity objectivity and ethics of evaluation** within the CGIAR.

5) **Option 2: Split Evaluation Function for the CGIAR (Central independent evaluation office (IEAO) and Consortium Evaluation Group -CEG):** The central evaluation functions of the CGIAR executed by a central independent evaluation office, reporting to the Fund Council and consulting with the Consortium and Centers; and the Support to the Centers and CRPs in decentralized evaluation provided by the Consortium Office. Functions distributed as follows include:

#### **The IEA Independent Evaluation Office (IEAO)**

- a) **Propose a rolling evaluation workplan and budget for the work of the IEAO** to the Fund Council for their approval.
- b) **Undertake, generally through commissioning independent consultants, the evaluation**, in line with the workplan, of:
  - The CGIAR system as a whole (terms of reference, including organizational arrangements approved by Fund Council), incorporating a full mutual accountability assessment, including that of donors and partners;
  - CRPs as a whole and other functions such as gene banks (meta-evaluation);
  - Such CGIAR wide themes and issues as may be identified and agreed in the workplan and budget;
  - Such evaluations as may be requested directly by the Consortium and/or Centers and for which funds are available.
- c) **Liaise with the Consortium on evaluation of CRP components undertaken by Lead Centers, CRP management and donors** on:
  - workplanning,
  - detailed standards and guidance, and
  - quality management.
- d) **Maintain and propose** modifications in the comprehensive CGIAR **evaluation policy and norms** to the Fund Council for their approval, following prior consultation by the evaluation office with the Consortium.

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<sup>3</sup> ILAC – CGIAR Institutional Learning and Change Initiative

- e) **Maintain the internal evaluation guidance for those evaluations falling directly under the responsibility of the IEAO<sup>4</sup>.**
- f) In consultation with the Consortium maintain, based on the policy and norms, **basic evaluation standards** with which all CGIAR entities of the CGIAR will be expected to comply.
- g) **Maintain a quality control check** on CRP component evaluation.
- h) **Work closely with SPIA and the Consortium** to facilitate the **complementarity of evaluation and impact assessment** in the CGIAR.
- i) **Liaise on and provide inputs for the Consortium Office public central evaluation data base** and reference website and work with the Consortium Office to **draw generalised lessons from evaluation** and disseminate them.
- j) **Produce with an input from the Consortium on CRP component evaluations, public biennial reports to the FC on evaluation in the CGIAR**, which will include assessments of the quality of evaluation processes and of IEAO and Center/CRP commissioned evaluations and of evaluation follow-up and learning as well as synthesising overall findings and lessons from evaluation and providing summaries of evaluations.
- k) **Liaise with the Consortium on results based monitoring and performance assessment to facilitate its complementarity with evaluation.**
- l) **Defend the independence, integrity objectivity and ethics of evaluation** within the CGIAR.

#### The Consortium Office

- m) **Coordinate planning** and maintain **detailed standards, guidance and quality management for evaluation of CRP components undertaken by Lead Centers, CRP management and donors.**
  - n) **Undertake the evaluation** through commissioning of any issues or themes decided to be of importance by the Centers and Consortium Board.
  - o) **Provide leadership in evaluation capacity building** and facilitate a community of evaluation practice.
  - p) **Work closely with SPIA and the IEAO** to facilitate the **complementarity of evaluation and impact assessment** in the CGIAR.
  - q) **Maintain, with an input from the IEAO, a public central evaluation data base** and reference website and **draw generalised lessons from evaluation** and disseminate them.
  - r) Provide an input to the IEAO on CRP Component evaluations for the **Biennial report to the FC on evaluation in the CGIAR.**
- 6) **Under both options:**
- a) Center Boards commission external review of the Center Management and governance function in consultation with the Consortium Board. Under option 1 the IEAO would provide an independent quality assurance report on such reviews to the relevant Board.
  - b) Lead Centers/CRP management undertake evaluation of CRP components in cooperation with donors and partners by commissioning independent consultants.

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<sup>4</sup> Consortium will handle guidance for the decentralised evaluation which it oversees

**Figure 1: Basis for Recommendation of Institutional Options - Comparison of:**

- **Option 1: Single Independent Evaluation Office (IEAO) for the CGIAR, and**
- **Option 2: Split Evaluation Function for the CGIAR (Central independent evaluation office (IEAO) and Consortium)**

	<b>Option 1: Single Independent Evaluation Office (IEAO)</b>	<b>Option 2: Split Evaluation Function between IEAO and Consortium Office (CO).</b>
<b>Key differences between options</b>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluation function centralized in one office (IEAO) responsible for all policy and guidance.</li> <li>• IEAO responsible for all central CGIAR evaluations</li> <li>• IEAO supports decentralized evaluation carried out by CRPs/lead Centers, manages Evaluation Community of Practice and maintains database of evaluations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluation split between IEAO and CO.</li> <li>• IEAO responsible for most central evaluations.</li> <li>• CO supports decentralized evaluations, manages Community of Practice and maintains database. IEAO provides quality Control.</li> </ul>
<b>Assessment against criteria</b>		
Independence	<b>Positive:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluation separate from operations</li> <li>• High-level independent evaluation director carries authority</li> <li>• Critical mass of evaluators reinforces confidence and reduces dependency</li> </ul>	<b>Positive:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to decentralized evaluation by Consortium Office separated from quality control by IEAO (note that this is a view of quality management at variance with this report)</li> </ul>
Non-duplication and cost-effectiveness	<b>Positive:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lower costs (see right)</li> <li>• Less potential for duplication (e.g. of consultant rosters)</li> <li>• Single CGIAR evaluation workplan and budget increases efficiency (see section 4)</li> <li>• Single group of evaluation staff easier to manage (vacancies, holidays etc)</li> <li>• Single node for liaison with SPIA</li> <li>• Single node for Evaluation Community of Practice</li> </ul>	<b>Negative:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Fixed costs higher if IEAO in either Rome or Washington (See Table 1)</i></li> <li>- <i>Likely higher transaction costs, including liaison between the offices and dual attendance at some meetings</i></li> <li>- <i>Likely there will be greater need for gap filling by IEAO in CRP evaluation</i></li> </ul>
Consultation, ownership and	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Both options support decentralized evaluations of CRP components, which promotes stakeholder participation in evaluation including end users</li> </ul>	

	<b>Option 1: Single Independent Evaluation Office (IEAO)</b>	<b>Option 2: Split Evaluation Function between IEAO and Consortium Office (CO).</b>
buy-in to evaluation by all stakeholders	<p>Positive:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Brings the IEAO close to the Centers and other stakeholders for consultation in maintaining evaluation norms and basic standards and unifies this with detailed guidance.</li> </ul>	<p>Positive:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Centers could possibly have greater control of CRP component evaluation in this option (but possibly to detriment of other stakeholders).</li> </ul> <p><i>Negative</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Less contact of IEAO with Centers makes system potentially less likely to respond to any requirement for major evaluations or identify major issues at Center level</i></li> </ul>
Evaluation quality	<p>Positive:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Critical mass of evaluation staff in one office favours skill development</li> </ul>	<p><i>Negative</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Risk that IEAO will become 'out of touch' if it has little to do with the building blocks of decentralized evaluations – affecting e.g. the quality of design of central evaluations and IEAO's quality management and assurance</i></li> </ul>
Usefulness of evaluations for decision making, learning and knowledge building	<p>Positive:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Authority to operationalise a system of management response to evaluations and reporting back on follow-up, including for within Centers</li> <li>One independent Office is in an easier and stronger position to provide accountability to all stakeholders on the performance of all elements and institutions of the CGIAR system in their roles and how they exercise their responsibility to other elements of the system<sup>5</sup>. It is also in a better position to produce a biennial report on evaluation in the CGIAR.</li> </ul>	<p>Positive:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Potentially could improve feedback to CRPs and between different CRPs at level of component evaluations.</li> </ul> <p><i>Negative:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>but may risk poor feedback between overall CRP evaluations and component evaluations</i></li> </ul>

7) Moreover, while it might be thought that greater managerial control of CRP evaluation through the Consortium would be regarded as an advantage by managers, this is not the case. Both the Consortium and the individual Centers have clearly stated as recently as their recent meetings in Montpellier (5-6 May) that they prefer a single office for all central evaluation functions so that they deal with one interface on all matters of evaluation and so that there is a single mechanism for evaluation to be responsive to their needs for decision making and improvement. They also believe that this will lead to more credible evaluation.

<sup>5</sup> The IEAO needs to be subject to separately commissioned evaluation by the FC in consultation with the Consortium

## 3.2 Evaluation staffing

**Recommendation 2:** Evaluation Staffing should be in line with functions and evaluation will generally be commissioned to independent consultants. Proposals for minimum initial staffing in line with Options 1&2 are provided below.

2.1: The evaluation work plan and budget will be fixed by the FC and in order to avoid any tendency for the evaluation office to expand at the expense of the actual conduct of evaluation work: The evaluation office fixed costs, including staff, should at no stage exceed a fixed percentage of total evaluation costs (see budget discussion below<sup>6</sup>).

2.2. Under both Options 1 and 2 the IEA will be headed by a full-time Director with the necessary seniority. In time there may be shown to be the need for an IEA advisory committee with an independent chair but this would have a cost and it should not be a priority.

2.3 The recruitment process for the IEA Director should be initiated immediately in order to start the work of the IEA early in 2012 (Appendix A)

### Staffing Levels

8) **The minimum staffing of a unified evaluation office** (Option 1) is recommended to consist of:

- Evaluation Director: This level is necessary to ensure independent reporting and responsibility to the FC and in order to recruit someone of the necessary calibre and competencies in agricultural development, research and evaluation and seniority to work with Center DGs, Consortium and FC Office as well as outside partners (all the IFIs, Major international Funds and main evaluation offices in the UN system have an evaluation head recruited at this level or higher). For functions of the Director see Annex 2;
- Senior Evaluation Officer and Evaluation Officer: The Director would be assisted by a senior evaluation officer, who would have the calibre and competencies to second for them in their absence, and an Evaluation Officer. Between them, with the direct involvement of the Evaluation Director as necessary, they would handle all the commissioning of evaluations, interaction with the Centers for the decentralized evaluation, quality assurance, maintaining the evaluation feedback system, etc. (see functions of the IEAO above under Options 1<sup>7</sup>);
- Support staff – administration: Duties including administrative contracting of consultants, travel and budget management. Even if services were to be shared with the ISPC or Fund Council, this function requires the equivalent of a full time post; and
- Support/junior professional post or equivalent for basic research and data analysis, website maintenance, etc.
- First priority for additional staffing once additional budget available: Evaluation officer – Community of evaluation practice, knowledge management and learning.

9) This is the absolute minimum staffing for the start-up of the IEAO. In a view shared by some members of the FC during the telephone discussions on the draft of this report, the Expert Reference Group has stated that they “were concerned that the proposed initial office had too few staff and would become totally absorbed in contracting. It could develop a project mentality, without the time to consider overall institutional issues and carry out its other envisaged functions, in particular

<sup>6</sup> There may also be a place for fixing a numerical maximum for the number of staff.

<sup>7</sup> Note there can be no specialisation of function in such a small office. The draft job descriptions will be developed by the consultants when the FC has decided the basic structure. Vacancy announcements can then be issued but selection should be undertaken by the newly appointed Director.

developing evaluation strategy and overall evaluation planning, as well as performing the knowledge management and learning functions. There was a danger of loss of institutional memory. It was also emphasised that staff of evaluation offices in most of the international organizations participated in evaluations and did not just commission. This, as noted in the inception report, contributed to overall learning and knowledge of the context as well as strengthening the substantive capacity of the evaluation office. It was hoped that a good balance could quickly be achieved between staff and the use of consultants.”

10) It may be further noted that, although a professionalised and independent evaluation function is now envisaged, this level of staffing differs little from the previous levels of staff input devoted to evaluation and review in the former Science Council (excluding SPIA which currently has two professional staff members –one senior-, support staff, a time input by the ISPC Director and its own Chair and panel) and the periodic independent evaluation of the CGIAR as a whole in the then CGIAR Secretariat in Washington<sup>8</sup>. It is also considerably lower than the staffing of central evaluation in major international agencies addressing technical cooperation and other forms of normative global public goods<sup>9</sup>. The number of evaluations being handled per professional staff member per year would be comparable to that for the OECD-DAC evaluation network (where it is 1-2 large evaluations<sup>10</sup>), in addition to the IAEO performance of important additional functions, in the support of decentralized evaluation of CRP components and maintenance of a community of evaluation practice in the CGIAR.

#### **Staffing with Split Evaluation Function (option2):**

11) **Staffing of the IEAO:** The IEAO would report independently and directly to the FC and only support services could be shared:

- Evaluation Director: The most complex evaluations remain the same and this level, as in Option 1, is necessary to ensure independent reporting and responsibility to the FC and in order to recruit someone of the necessary calibre and competencies. For functions of the Director see Annex 2;
- Senior Evaluation Officer: The Director would be assisted by a senior evaluation officer who would have the calibre and competencies to second for them in their absence; and
- Equivalent of one mid level support staff – possibly shared with the ISPC or FC Office (depending on location) to undertake duties, including contracting of consultants, travel and budget management and assistance with basic research and data analysis, etc.

12) **Consortium evaluation staffing:** There is no assumption of independence for the functions vis-à-vis evaluation of CRPs and other elements of the Centers’ work, however evaluation expertise would be essential, although this might be shared to some extent with strategic planning or monitoring. There is a requirement for the full-time equivalent of:

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<sup>8</sup> Detailed estimates were made for 2005 (a year in which there was no exceptional evaluation activity and for evaluation excluding monitoring) the then Science Council office provided for evaluation and review 1.2 senior professional equivalent and 0.2 Director equivalent plus support staff time equivalent to 1.2 persons. This was in addition to input by the Science Council itself. The then ISPC secretariat provided over half a person professional equivalent plus support staff. This takes no account of the time spent in the Centers which organised the Center reviews in advance of the External Programme and Monitoring Reviews (EPRS) – Source ISPC.

<sup>9</sup> e.g. Numbers of professionals in central evaluation: FAO: 8, UNDP: 9, UNICEF: 8, UNESCO, 6 (source: JIU/REP/2006/2, Oversight Lacunae in the United Nations System, UN Joint Inspection Unit Geneva 2006)

<sup>10</sup> OECD (2010), *Evaluation in Development Agencies*, Better Aid, OECD Publishing.

- One senior evaluation officer;
- One evaluation officer; and
- One midlevel support staff.

Fund Council-Evaluation Based in Rome	Fund Council Evaluation Based in Washington	Consortium Evaluation Montpellier	Total of split evaluation function if Fund Council Evaluation Rome	Total of split evaluation function if Fund Council evaluation Washington	Total of staff costs for consolidated Evaluation Function Rome	Total of staff costs for consolidated Evaluation Function Washington
634	611	565	1,199	1,176	936	841

Staff cost for Split Evaluation is higher than staff cost for Consolidated Evaluation in Rome by an additional 28% and if in Washington by an additional 40% at current exchange rates (\$ to €)

13) **Under both Options 1 and 2** there would be flexible use of consultancy by the IEAO within agreed budget for such activities as development of guidance and development of knowledge and learning platforms.

### **The Director IEA**

14) Functions for the Director IEA are provided in Appendix A at the end of this report in line with the functions of the IEAO as discussed above under Options 1&2.

15) **The Alternative of having a Part-time Director or Chair rather than a full-time Director for the IEA:** In order to attract a person of the necessary calibre and international standing, it has been suggested that a part time Director or a Chair could be recruited. The examples of SPIA and the ISPC have been cited in this regard.

16) In the case of SPIA and the ISPC, the chairs play a positive role in guidance and acting as a senior spokesperson for the functions in the FC and major international meetings but they are supported by a substantial office headed at the level of Director and in the case of SPIA there are two professional staff of which one is senior devoted to its work, in addition to inputs from the Director and other staff of the ISPC office. This was discussed further by the Expert Reference Group which noted there was no parallel for such an arrangement for evaluation in any of the international organizations. Although some evaluation offices have advisory committees, the chairs of these are in no way executive and it is an additional expense. The Director needs to be constantly available and fully engaged in the work of the office to provide the seniority in dealing with Centers, the Fund Council, Consortium and the team leaders of evaluations, who are also senior. At the practical level, it would probably be very difficult to attract anybody of the necessary calibre to Rome or Washington to carry out the duties on a part time basis and flying somebody in and out for a strong engagement with the work would be expensive. It would be necessary to employ an additional full

<sup>11</sup> These staff costs are derived for equivalence from FAO trust fund budget tables 2011 and figures provided by the Fund Council Office for WB staff costs.

time staff member, at least at the level of evaluation officer, and a senior evaluation officer would have to fulfil many of the functions of Director.

17) **Requirements for Recruitment of a Director for the IEA:** Requirements for the recruitment of a Director for the IEA are provided in Annex 2. It is urgent to initiate this process for a start up of the IEA in early 2012. The schedule will require the establishment of a panel by the end of July and wide publication of the vacancy by 1 September in order to close the vacancy in October and make a recommendation to the FC in December on the individual to be appointed (there is not sufficient time to make this recommendation prior to the FC meeting in November).

### 3.3 The Choice Between Siting the IEAO at FAO in Rome or at the World Bank in Washington

**Recommendation 3:** It is recommended that the IEAO be sited at FAO in Rome

**Figure 2: Basis for Recommendation on Choice of Location for the IEAO**

	FAO - Rome	WB - Washington
Independence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Under both options there would need to be guarantees of full operational and substantive independence. FAO has demonstrated this can be adequately achieved for the ISPC and the WB in the case of the GEF. An <u>additional assurance of this firewall</u> might be obtained by nesting the IEA with the independent evaluation office of the host institution (FAO or WB)</li> </ul>	
	Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Neutral location, avoiding either the perception of, or actual, lack of independence in evaluation from any major donor to the CGIAR or the FC Office or the Consortium.</li> </ul>	Negative <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>See column 1</li> </ul>
Cost efficiency and effectiveness	Negative <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Costs see column 2 - Washington</li> </ul> Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Central location with respect to time zones for on line meetings and for travel</li> <li>Ease of interaction with ISPC and SPIA (see below) including facilitating merging the evaluation and impact assessment community of practice)</li> <li>Ease of interaction with the Institutional Learning and Change Initiative (ILAC) based in Bioversity</li> </ul>	Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Estimates (Table 2) are that an office hosted in the World Bank at current US\$ - € exchange rates would have fixed costs some 9 percent lower in the World Bank in Washington than in FAO in Rome. This differential holds true regardless of the size of the unit. There are probably no other major cost differentials between the two locations (consultant fees, etc.)</li> </ul> It has been suggested that Washington would facilitate efficiency gains through reporting through the FC Office and/or reporting to the Chair of the FC rather than the FC. <b>This would be a clear breach of the OECD-DAC and UNEG principles of independence and would be contrary to the practice of all major international organizations.</b>
Ownership and	Positive	Negative

	FAO - Rome	WB - Washington
buy-in to evaluation by all stakeholders, including Centers, partners and end-users of research	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Linked to confidence of all parties in the neutrality and independence of the IEAO. A neutral location will favour this</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Inverse of Column 1 (Rome)</i></li> </ul>
Evaluation quality	<p>Positive</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contacts with the ISPC, facilitating drawing on the institutional memory of CGIAR evaluation in the ISPC</li> <li>Contact with SPIA for development of an integrated evaluation work plan, both overall and for individual CRPs, incorporating impact assessment and integrating the ongoing work of SPIA with that of the IEAO in developing a CGIAR community of evaluation practice</li> <li>Potential for technical interchange with three other evaluation offices concentrated on food and agriculture (FAO, IFAD, WFP) and with FAO on agricultural policy, etc.</li> </ul>	<p>Positive</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Potential for technical interchange with three other evaluation offices concentrated on investment (WB, IADB and the GEF) and with the World Bank Research Department</li> </ul>
Feed-back for decision making, Learning and Knowledge building	<p>Positive</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Facilitates communication for feedback to the ISPC of evaluation findings for their use in CRP appraisal</li> <li>Facilitates communication for feedback of evaluation lessons through ILAC</li> <li>Physically closer to the Consortium and in the same time zone</li> </ul>	<p>Positive</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Facilitates communication for feedback to the FC Office of evaluation findings relevant to funding and institutional issues</li> </ul>

<b>Table 2: Indicative Annual Fixed Costs of a Single Evaluation Office US\$000</b>	<b>Rome (US\$000)</b>	<b>Washington (US\$000)</b>
Total staff <sup>12</sup>	936	841
Office space and facilities including for consultants & meetings	23	30
Other including computers, printers, office furniture, telecommunications, etc.	20	20
Travel on business other than direct costs of individual evaluations	15	15
Total fixed costs	994	906
Costs percentage differential Washington compared with Rome		-9%

## 4. Workplanning and Budgeting

### 4.1 Function and importance of an integrated CGIAR Rolling Evaluation Work plan

**Recommendation 4:** It is recommended that there be a unified rolling evaluation workplan for the CGIAR (with a four year time frame) and approved each one or two years by the Fund Council, following consultation by the IEAO with the Consortium (see Annex 1 to this report for consultation process).

18) A unified workplan should be aimed for either under Options 1 or 2 but will be easier to achieve under Option 1. It will also be easier to achieve with a unified evaluation budget (see below). The four year time horizon provides an overall framework and allows scheduling and prioritisation of evaluation needs, also with decision making on CRPs, etc., while the rolling nature of the plan also provides for flexibility and responsiveness to evolving needs. The Plan will help to ensure full transparency on evaluation in the CGIAR and that:

- Evaluation is responding to immediate needs of all stakeholders, including managers;
- Decentralized evaluation of CRP components serves the needs of managers, users and provides a representative sample basis for the evaluation of each CRP as a whole;
- Donors evaluation requirements are in so far as possible integrated with evaluation of CRP components and subcomponents and separate donor evaluations are drawn on as much as possible for CRP component evaluations (for consultation mechanism with donors – see Annex 3);
- Impact assessment can most effectively contribute to the evaluation of CRPs and the system wide evaluation of the CGIAR;
- The evaluation demands on time of scientists, managers and partners are distributed evenly; and
- There is overall efficiency in the use of evaluation resources and accountability for evaluation outputs.

19) The workplan will specify the dates, responsibilities and approximate timing for all evaluations and any major development of guidance, resource materials, etc., and will include:

<sup>12</sup> Staffing as above (paragraph 8). These staff costs are derived for equivalence from FAO trust fund budget tables 2011 and figures provided by the Fund Council Office for WB staff costs. It is important to recognise the indicative nature of the figures.

- CRP evaluations;
- Evaluations of CRP components and subcomponents with some flexibility (due to the imperfectly-predictable nature of research and the needs of management and donors);
- Other evaluations of gene banks, etc and of specific issues and themes of interest across the CGIAR; and
- Overall system evaluation of the CGIAR, including any preparatory studies.

20) The CRP evaluation plan would be designed in such a way as to meet the requirements of all parties, including providing a representative sampling and examination of issues for the overall evaluation of the CRP and an evaluation plan for each CRP would be developed between the Central Evaluation Function and the CRP management, consulting also with key donors, partners and users of the CRP. This will both markedly strengthen the overall depth and quality of the periodic CRP evaluation as a whole and reduce its costs.

## 4.2 Budgeting for Evaluation

### Budget Recommendation 5:

- **The IEA should form a separate budget line under Windows 1 and 2** and not form part of the budget for system costs.
- **The IEA Budget should be set with a cap and target level** of 2% of the Windows 1&2 Expenditure.
- **Matching grants for CRP component evaluation for quality and coherence:** The decentralized evaluation of CRP components approved by the IEA (or Consortium under Option 2) should be 50% funded from the central evaluation budget as matching grants.
- **The central evaluation budget should start at US\$3 million in 2012** and rise to \$4.6 million at 2011 constant prices from 2014 when the cap and target would become effective. A higher budget would be needed for the split evaluation option.
- The workings of the evaluation budget system in its entirety should be subject to review after 3 - 4 years of operations.

21) **Detail of the Recommendation:** Evaluation delivers very clear benefits in terms of confidence and accountability of the CGIAR, and better decisions at all levels of management and governance as well as users of the CGIAR, both as an immediate product of evaluation findings and recommendations and through the process of institutional learning from evaluation. The cost of evaluation must be in proportion to those benefits and is subject to diminishing returns, as both the insights from evaluation and the absorption capacity of stakeholders, decrease with increasing volumes of evaluation.

22) There are three key issues for budgeting:

- Should the IEA form Part of the System Costs or be a Separate Budget Line Windows 1 and 2?** All CGIAR functions and programs are subject to evaluation but although total expenditure by CGIAR institutions is currently somewhat over US\$ 500 million per year, that under Windows 1 & 2 which is directly subject to the control of the CGIAR Fund Council and allocated by it for CRPs, is currently of the order of US\$ 200 million per year and is expected to rise to US\$ 300 million in 2012. The arguments are set out in Figure 3 A. Our

recommended option is Option 2: evaluation costs form a separate budget line under Windows 1 and 2.

- b) **What proportion of Windows 1 &2 funding should be allocated to evaluation? And should evaluation be budgeted applying a norm of a set percentage of Windows 1&2 as both a Cap and Target or should the budget be set annually purely on the basis of evaluation requirements?** The proportion for evaluation is a function of the complexity and value of evaluation to the type of program. Large scale investments are clearly less complex than technical cooperation. Policy work and piloting are more complex than technical cooperation *sui generis*. Research is probably the most complex and most able to benefit from more detailed findings. Nowhere is this more true than for research to deliver global public goods, where the outputs of research rely most heavily on partners and intermediate users to deliver their eventual development impacts. This, taken together with the complexity of the CGIAR institutional structure and the fact that Windows 1 and 2 currently cover only 40% of CGIAR total expenditures, makes it difficult to arrive at a percentage figure by direct comparisons with international organizations but 2% of Windows 1 and 2 which is currently some 0.8% of total CGIAR expenditure is comparable with other organizations<sup>13</sup> and it is recommended that the cap and target be set at this level (2%) The arguments are set out in Figure 3 B. Our recommended option is that a fixed percentage be applied.
- **Should a proportion of CRP component/sub-component evaluation costs be met through matching grants from the IEA budget for Center/CRP commissioned evaluations which meet IEA standards and are in line with the Evaluation Rolling work plan or should all the costs of evaluation be met from CRP program funds?** The arguments are set out in Figure 3 C. Our recommended option is matching grants. The CGIAR is not a unified organization where orders can be sent from the IEA to Centers. There must be incentive and shared benefits. Even in unified organizations if there is no credible incentive (negative or positive) compliance with requirements for decentralized evaluation are poor. The matching payments system provides such an incentive positively<sup>14</sup>. The main argument against matching grants is that ex post quality control and reporting on decentralised evaluation, as practised in the World Bank, other IFIs and the GEF would not be fully independent if the IEA Office was involved in approving CRP component evaluation terms of reference, etc. The proposal is to deal with this by outsourcing quality assurance to an independent panel in cases where there is likely to be any conflict of interest. In addition, the independent teams evaluating CRPs as a whole will be quite separate from those that looked at components and they can undertake independent verification (see Annex 5).

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<sup>13</sup> The IDRC estimates central evaluation expenditure at 1.5-2.0 percent of total expenditure. FAO has established in its basic texts that 0.8 percent of total regular budget (including the administrative budget) is to be devoted to evaluation and 1.0 percent of the budget from non regular budget resources which are principally for various forms of technical cooperation.

<sup>14</sup> An example of the successful application of such a system was in FAO with DFID funding

**Figure 3: Issues in Budgeting**

**3 A: Should the IEA form Part of the System Costs or be a Separate Budget Line Windows 1 and 2?**

Separate Charge on Windows 1&2	Part of System Costs
<p>Arguments for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluation is a separate function to Overhead. It is transparent to clearly see evaluation costs and what it is as a proportion of expenditure, facilitating all making a judgment on evaluation's value.</li> <li>• It makes it easier for the Fund Council to make a decision on the budget for evaluation.</li> <li>• There is no direct bureaucratic competition for funding with the FC and Consortium Offices.</li> <li>• Donors who separately fund evaluation of their projects will not be double charged (system costs are charged on total program – not just that falling directly under the FC through Windows 1 &amp; 2).</li> <li>• As funding through Windows 1 and 2 rises, the costs of evaluations can rise in proportion</li> </ul> <p><i>Arguments against:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The IEA office is in the current Operations Manual as a part of the system Costs but this can be changed by the FC.</i></li> </ul>	<p>Arguments for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is suggested that this prevents evaluation becoming a charge on program expenditures. <b>But</b> this is not the case as all the expenditures originate from the same basic pool of funds.</li> <li>• The World Bank and some of the other IFIs have evaluation as part of their administrative budgets.</li> </ul> <p><i>Arguments against:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>But</b> this is not the practice of most non IFIs (e.g. UNDP, FAO or the GEF) and the WB administrative budget does not equate to the CGIAR System costs which do not include the major administrative overheads in the Centers themselves which are effectively a charge on the Program Budgets. A charge on administrative budgets may makes sense for organizations which make loans rather than grants and with very large, lumpy investment expenditures (for example for infrastructure) where linking evaluation spending to a percentage of investment might result in overly high evaluation expenditures.</li> <li>• sends a message to researchers and other stakeholders that evaluation is an administrative overhead, not an essential part of the research</li> <li>• Historically, when evaluation is counted as an administrative overhead, it has been among the first targets for cutbacks when savings need to be made, particularly if managers feel uncomfortable with some of the messages coming from evaluation.</li> </ul>

3 B: Should evaluation be budgeted applying a norm of a set percentage of Windows 1&2 as both a Cap and Target or should the budget be set annually purely on the basis of evaluation requirements?	
IEA Budget Cap and Target as a Fixed Percentage of Windows 1&2	Budget set Annually on the Basis of Evaluation Requirements
<p>Arguments for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The OECD-DAC<sup>15</sup>, the UN Joint Inspection Unit<sup>16</sup> and FAO have applied the norm of percentage of total aid expenditure in assessing evaluation budgets.</li> <li>• Setting a cap on the budget in this way reduces the tendency for evaluation to expand to the point of significant diminishing returns to effort.</li> <li>• Providing a target in this way increases the objectivity of decision making.</li> <li>• Having a target, helps guarantee the independence of evaluation, as the IEA is not in repeated annual negotiation for its budget.</li> <li>• Facilitates medium-term planning for evaluation and the evaluation program being adjusted in line with the size of the research program.</li> </ul> <p><i>Arguments against</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>None.</b> Fund Council remains with the final decision on the budget and can adjust this at any time.</li> <li>• <i>The argument for using a percentage of administrative expenditure as a cap, rather than a percentage of total expenditure, is dealt with above.</i></li> </ul>	<p>Arguments for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Allows the FC to set the IEA budget annually purely on the basis of an agreed evaluation work plan and resource requirements for the coming year.</li> </ul> <p><i>Arguments against</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The IEA may continually push for more resources as there is not a normative frame and in doing so may compromise its independence.</i></li> <li>• <i>Medium-term evaluation planning will be more difficult.</i></li> <li>• <i>The FC and probably the Consortium will need to spend more time each year deciding the appropriate level for the evaluation budget.</i></li> </ul>

<sup>15</sup> OECD (2010), *Evaluation in Development Agencies*, Better Aid, OECD Publishing

<sup>16</sup> JIU/REP/2006/2, *Oversight Lacunae in the United Nations System*, UN Joint Inspection Unit Geneva 2006

<p><b>3 C: Should a proportion of CRP component/sub-component evaluation costs be met through matching grants from the IEA budget for Center/CRP commissioned evaluations which meet IEA standards and are in line with the Evaluation Rolling work plan or should all the costs of evaluation be met from CRP program funds?</b></p>	
<p><b>A proportion of CRP component/sub-component evaluation costs met through matching grants from the IEA budget for Center/CRP commissioned evaluations which meet IEA standards and are in line with the Evaluation Rolling workplan?</b></p>	<p><b>All the costs of CRP component and sub component evaluation met from CRP program funds and IEA has no involvement in the planning of those evaluations ?</b></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In a highly decentralized organization, there are risks that incentives for answering central evaluation questions are weak. Matching grants significantly strengthen incentives to evaluate areas and issues which may be more a central priority than a local one.</li> <li>• It facilitates the necessary dialogue and coordination in developing overall evaluation plans for CRPs which meet the needs of CRP management and also provide representative sampling for the overall evaluation of the CRP by the IEA.</li> <li>• It facilitates total quality management and assurance for the evaluation process by the IEAO (Option 1) or Consortium (Option 2) see Annex 5.</li> <li>• Is transparent on evaluation costs for the CGIAR as a whole and involves no net loss to CRPs of funding, as the costs of evaluation would have to be borne entirely by the CRPs if not funded in part centrally.</li> </ul> <p><i>Arguments against – see discussion in next column</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ex post quality control and reporting on decentralised evaluation would not be independent if carried out by the same individuals that had approved the matching grants. This has been addressed by having an independent external panel for quality assurance.</li> </ul> <p><i>Arguments against</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b><i>But</i></b> the aim is to achieve the highest appropriateness and quality of evaluation rather than an ex post reporting on quality (although reporting would take place). This can be best achieved if there is leverage from the IEA office to promote adherence to an overall evaluation plan and quality and independence in the evaluations themselves, especially at this stage of evaluation capacity in the Centers.</li> <li>• <b><i>And</i></b> There will be an ex post quality verification process employing an independent external panel. The independent teams evaluating CRPs as a whole will be quite separate from those that looked at components and they can undertake independent verification see Annex 5.</li> <li>• Total evaluation costs would probably be higher in the absence of central funding to promote a coordinated and integrated approach, as more central gap filling and verification is likely to be needed for CRP evaluation.–see Table 3 below</li> </ul>

<b>Table 3: Annual Costs of Evaluation of CRPs with and without Central Funding for Decentralized Evaluation</b>		
Activity	Option A CRP Component evaluation funded solely by CRPs (US\$000)	Option B Matching central funding for CRP Component evaluation (US\$000)
Central funding grants to CRP component evaluation*	0	2,250
Evaluation costs borne directly by CRPs for component evaluation**	4,500	2,250
Costs for the Periodic Overall evaluation of CRPs***	1,350	750
<b>Total annual costs of CRP evaluation</b>	<b>5,850</b>	<b>5,250</b>
Of which - centrally funded	1,350	3,000
Notes: 50% matching grants; **CRP subcomponent evaluation cost is budgeted at \$300k per CRP per annum. In practice rates will vary greatly with size and complexity of the CRP and type of research; ***This is costed at 3x\$350,000 per annum for option 1 and 3 x \$250,000 per annum for option 2, on the assumption that more gap-filling and validation will be needed from the center in the absence of incentive for a fully integrated evaluation plan.		

### Basis for the Evaluation Budget

<b>Table 4: Annual minimum budget for evaluation with a single evaluation office in Rome at current prices (US\$ 000)</b>		
Fixed Costs of evaluation office including staff and some supporting consultancy and the independent quality assurance panel (US 50,000 total) (see Annex 6 for base costs of staff, etc.)	1,044	22%
Annualised cost of the 6-7 year evaluation of the CGIAR as a whole*	400	9%
Total central costs per year of CRP evaluation with Central Funding (of which evaluation grants to CRPs US\$ 2,250,000)	3,000	65%
Conduct of other evaluations, gene banks, issues, ISPC, FC, etc.	200	4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,594</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>As percentage of current 2011 Windows 1&amp;2 (US\$ 300 million)</b>	<b>1.55%</b>	
* It is recommended that the 6-7 year evaluation of the CGIAR as a whole be included in the annual budget and funds accumulated. This will facilitate planning and prevent the need for separate allocation and negotiation processes for this.		

23) Table 5: recommends the evolution of the evaluation budget as not all staff and work will initiate in 2012 and full establishment and work plan will come completely on stream during 2013.

Year	US\$ million at 2011 prices	Notes
2012	3.0	Assumes that not all posts would be immediately filled or a full evaluation work program get under way and excludes exclude annualised evaluation costs of the CGIAR as a whole
2013	4.0	All posts would be filled but there is likely to be some remaining slippage in the work program. Any carryover from 2012 should be included in the US\$ 4 million
2014 onwards	4.6	US\$ 4.6 million <u>or 2.0 % of Windows 1 &amp; 2 funding</u> , whichever figure is higher. If Windows 1 & 2 funding grow at the predicted rate, the 2% formula will rapidly come into force (2% of Windows 1 and 2 Funding for the central evaluation budget is currently (2011) equal to about 1.0 percent of CGIAR total expenditure)

**It is recommended that:**

- First priority for additional funds within the 2% ceiling should be **knowledge management and leadership and support of a Community of Practice in evaluation** (if Rome based US\$ 300,000 per year)<sup>17</sup>.
- **In order to avoid any tendency for the IEAO to expand at the expense of the actual conduct of evaluation work, the evaluation office fixed costs, including staff, should at no stage exceed 35% of total evaluation costs.**
- **Grants for decentralized evaluation should be fixed at a minimum of 35% of the total evaluation budget.**

## **5. Deliverables by the Consultants - During the Remainder of the Consultancy for Development of the CGIAR –IEA**

**Recommendation 6: The FC is asked to approve the deliverables of the remainder of consultancy for development of the CGIAR – IEA as detailed in Section 5**

24) **Deliverables:**

- a) **CGIAR Evaluation Policy, Norms and Basic Standards** (main responsibility JM): The decisions of the July FC are fundamental to the finalisation of this document which will be presented to the November FC for decision following consultation with stakeholders, including the Consortium, Centers, users of CGIAR outputs and donors.
- b) **Prospective coverage of guidance materials on evaluation standards, methods and tools** (main responsibility JC except where otherwise indicated in Annex 7): Guidance

<sup>17</sup> Costs would be: one evaluation officer, an office and communication costs. This amounts, if based in Rome, to US\$ 210,000. Direct costs of one seminar per year would be of the order of US\$ 80,000 with attendance from all CRPs/Centers. Total costs of this function would thus be of the order of US\$ 300,000 per year.

materials on standards, methods and tools will be addressed in the final reporting by the consultants as guidance notes. Work on methods and tools will require further input from the IEA once established (and under institutional Option 2, also the Consortium) and collaboration with SPIA will be important for this. Furthermore, methods and tools are constantly evolving and guidance will always be advisory and supportive. The coverage of the guidance notes for completion by the termination of the consultancy and for presentation of work in progress for information to the November Council is provided as Annex 7.

c) **Performance Management Monitoring and Information Systems** (main responsibility JC):

- Ongoing notes and advice to the Consortium which has responsibility for this on the development of the Performance Management Monitoring and Information System(s) on CGIAR Research Programmes (CRPs) and other elements of CGIAR performance.
- Provision also of advice on monitoring of the CGIAR separately requested by the Fund Council Office.

d) **Support to the Recruitment of the Director of the CGIAR-IEA** (lead responsibility JM): Pending the decision of the July FC meeting secretariat support will be provided through this consultancy for Recruitment of the Director of the CGIAR-IEA – see Appendix A. Job descriptions will also be developed for the other staff of the IAEO and if Option 2 selected, for the Consortium.

e) **Agreement with Host Agency for IEA** (FAO or WB – lead responsibility JM): Progress on this depends on the decision being taken by the July FC and a formal request to the institution. Following this the consultants will formally take up the matter with the host agency. As necessary firewall protection of independence is essential, any significant issues in this regard will be referred by the consultants to the FC.

## 6. Budget for Remainder of the Consultancy

**Recommendation 7:** The FC is requested to approve an adjustment in the evaluation budget, without any change in the total budget or timing, to allow greater flexibility in completing the assignment; creating a flexible reserve to be allocated if necessary at the discretion of the lead consultant subject to normal fiduciary requirements.

25) In view of the delays in the establishment of the expert reference group and cuts in the travel of the consultants, there are likely to be overall savings on these two budget items. There is a possible need to support the unforeseen expenditure of initiating recruitment of an evaluation director. Also the unforeseen interval in taking some final decisions has delayed some work on development of detailed guidance and there may be a need to devote more resources to this. The Fund Council is thus asked to approve a revised budget for the remainder of the consultancy as detailed below with a fungible reserve item of US\$ 32,000 for use if necessary at the discretion of the lead consultant.

<b>Table 6: Revised Budget for the IEA Consultancy</b>	<b>Expenses</b>	<b>Honoraria</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Cost inception phase (total)</b>	<b>23,000</b>	<b>39,000</b>	<b>62,000</b>
Consultant travel and incidental expenses up to and including Montpellier	23,000		23,000
Consultant honoraria up to delivery of inception report (2x30 days each)		39,000	39,000
<b>Cost Design Phase for IEA</b>	<b>77,000</b>	<b>81,000</b>	<b>158,000</b>
Consultant travel and incidental expenses (including attendance at two meetings of the Fund Council and possibly meetings of the Consortium)	20,000		20,000
Consultant honoraria (indicatively 55 days Markie +74 days Compton)		81,000	81,000
Reference panel honoraria and expenses	25,000		25,000
Flexible reserve	32,000		32,000
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>100,000</b>	<b>120,000</b>	<b>220,000</b>

## **Appendix A**

### **Appointment, Functions and Competencies of the Director CGIAR, Independent Evaluation Arrangement (IEA)**

In order for the establishment of the CGIAR, Independent Evaluation Arrangement (IEA) to proceed in a timely way from early 2012, it is necessary to move rapidly on the appointment of the Director of the IEA and its office (IEAO).

#### **Arrangements for Recruitment of the Director CGIAR IEA:**

- **By 31 July 2011:** To provide advice to the FC on the recruitment of the Director IEA and be responsible for her/his subsequent annual performance assessment, the CGIAR Fund Council will establish a five person panel with a chair from the FC, a representative of the Consortium appointed by the Consortium Board, one representative of CGIAR Centers appointed by the Center DGs, one representative of GFAR and one Director of an evaluation office in the international system (possibly from among CGIAR sponsors, FAO, IFAD, WB). The secretary to the panel, also appointed by the FC, will be an independent senior evaluation expert (if time table adhered to – this could be included in present consultancy).
- **By 1 September 2011:** Issue and widely circulate the vacancy announcement.
- **By 15 October 2011:** Closure of vacancy.
- **By 1 December 2011:** Recommendation of working group to FC on individual to be appointed, together with any separate comments of the Consortium (there is not sufficient time to make this recommendation prior to the FC meeting in November).

#### **Functions and Qualifications of the Director CGIAR IEA**

**Functions of the Director** (based on option 1 - to be modified if Option 2 or a part time Director decided on by the FC, which is not recommended):

**Reporting directly to the CGIAR Fund Council and liaising closely with the CGIAR Consortium Board and CGIAR Centers**, the Director will be responsible for the direction and management of the IEA and the execution of the IEA Office (IEAO) functions as defined in the CGIAR Evaluation Policy. These include:

- Developing and proposing to the Fund Council for their approval and/or action:
  - Modifications as required from time to time in the comprehensive CGIAR evaluation policy and norms;
  - Rolling evaluation workplan and budget for the CGIAR System;
  - Measures to fully protect the independence of the IEAO staff and consultants and evaluation staff and consultants in the Centers and of the IEAO itself; and
  - Terms of reference for the periodic evaluation of the CGIAR system as a whole.
- Timely management and implementation of the policies and work plan within budget:
  - Maintaining in line with the policy and norms, detailed evaluation standards and guidance for all evaluation in the CGIAR;
  - Undertaking, largely by commissioning independent consultants, the agreed evaluation program of the IEAO;
  - Facilitating the operation of the system for evaluation follow-up and inputting evaluation knowledge to the CGIAR knowledge management and learning systems;
  - Leadership, support and quality management, including quality assurance, for evaluation of CRP components and subcomponents undertaken by Lead Centers/CRP management and other decentralized evaluations;
  - Building and managing the evaluation team, including, selection, recruitment and supervision of IEAO staff and contracting and supervision of consultants;
- Leadership in evaluation and evaluation knowledge management in the CGIAR:
  - Leadership in evaluation capacity building and facilitation of a community of evaluation practice within the CGIAR system;
  - Maintenance of a public central evaluation data base and reference website;
  - Liaison with the Consortium to facilitate the complementarity of results based monitoring for which the Consortium Board is responsible and performance assessment with independent evaluation;
  - Representing the CGIAR externally on evaluation matters and bringing external best-evaluation practice into the CGIAR; and
  - Producing public biennial reports to the FC and CB on evaluation in the CGIAR, which will include assessments of the quality of evaluation processes and of IEAO and Center/CRP commissioned evaluations and of evaluation follow-up and learning as well as synthesising overall findings and lessons from evaluation and providing summaries of evaluations.

**Qualifications and Experience:** The target qualifications and experience are that the Director will be a senior evaluation professional with at least 15 years' experience, of which a minimum of 10, will have been at international level and include extensive experience of agricultural development, preferably including agricultural research.

- Evaluation: Senior practical and managerial experience in the organization and conduct of development evaluations at all levels from project to program and institution, including the evaluation of research and other programs where the output-impact line of causality is complex and long. Competency in impact assessment, participatory evaluation and capacity building in evaluation will also be an asset;
- Agricultural development and research: Wide and senior international competency in agricultural development, including forestry and fisheries and the role of research in

development. Direct experience of carrying out agricultural or natural resources research will be an asset;

- Management: Experience of managing evaluation units and/or teams. Competency in planning, budgeting, supervision of staff, and contracting. Experience of inter-governmental governance will be an asset;
- Presentation, writing and analysis: Ability to present to major meetings and to write, clearly, concisely and analytically;
- Personal qualities, demonstrated:
  - Capacities of independence, objective analysis, and decision making;
  - Ability to work without bias and motivate persons of diverse cultures, backgrounds and gender;
  - Consultative approach, work in a networked manner, respect for the competencies of others and team building;
  - Excellent communication skills.

#### Qualifications:

- Academic: Higher degree (preferably PhD) or equivalent experience in agricultural, economic or social science or evaluation
- Geographical: Experience of working in extensive missions or long-term assignments in at least two and preferably all of the developing regions of the world, particularly Africa and Asia
- Languages: Essential: Good spoken and written English. Desirable: Knowledge of additional international languages<sup>18</sup>.

**Terms and Conditions of Employment:** With an initial probation period of one year, the Director of the CGIAR IEA will be appointed for a term of four years with the possibility of renewal for a maximum of a further four years. The incumbent may not take up any other post, consultancy or Board membership in the CGIAR system for at least two years after leaving the post of Director IEA.

This is a Director level appointment. Terms and conditions of employment, including salary level, benefits and age of mandatory retirement will be those of FAO Rome or WB Washington (depending on FC decision) and the appointment level, subject to competencies and experience will be D1 or D2 if FAO, Grade H or I if WB.

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<sup>18</sup> Such as Arabic, Chinese, French, Portuguese, Spanish and Russian